Ban Ki-moon says any military operation could worsen humanitarian situation and focus must be on dialogue
The United Nations has thrown a large bucket of cold water over plans for international military intervention in northern Mali, despite growing pressure on west African countries from the US and European Union to move aggressively to counter al-Qaida infiltration in the largely ungoverned Sahara and Sahel regions.
The UN's timely demarche, stressing caution and the preferability of dialogue, reflects unhappy past experiences in Somalia, where an African Union (AU) force has struggled to impose order after the failure of direct American intervention in the 1990s.
It also implicitly invites the principal actors to examine their motives. Congo provides a vivid example of why neighbours do not always know what is best for neighbours. The UN this month accused Rwanda and Uganda of destabilising eastern DRC, even as an east African "stabilisation" force was discussed.
The Mali report by the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, is bluntly to the point. "I am profoundly aware that if a military intervention in the north is not well conceived and executed, it could worsen an already fragile humanitarian situation and also result in severe human rights abuses," Ban said.
"Fundamental questions on how the force would be led, sustained, trained, equipped and financed remain unanswered … A military operation may be required as a last resort to deal with the most hardline extremist and criminal elements in the north. But, before that stage is reached, the focus must be on initiating a broad-based and inclusive political dialogue aimed at forging national consensus around a roadmap for transition."
Mali was in effect split in two earlier this year when Tuareg separatists drove out the Malian army after a coup. But they in turn have been supplanted by al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), affiliated jihadi groups, the Islamist movement Ansar Dine, and criminal gangsters armed with weapons purloined during the chaos of Libya's civil war.
Ban said that if peaceful means failed to resolve the crisis, the proposed force, to be organised by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the AU, should "assist the Malian authorities to recover the occupied region in the north of Mali in order to restore the unity and territorial integrity of Mali and reduce the threats posed by terrorist and affiliated groups and transnational organised crime".
But he made clear the UN would not pay for the operation, would supply logistical support only, and would restrict any initial mandate to one year.
The secretary general's unusually firm stance poses a problem for the UN security council, which is due to discuss Mali on 5 December. Diplomats have said a resolution approving the force could be passed by the end of the year – but this schedule reflects American and French wishes more than African realities.
The US focus is primarily on suppressing al-Qaida, not Islamist misrule in northern Mali or the accompanying human rights abuses and humanitarian crisis. Washington fears AQIM is spreading its influence north and south of the Sahel, threatening major regional allies such as Algeria and Nigeria. But it does not want to get involved directly, hence pressure on Ecowas to act.
France has historic and business interests in the region, and has been outraged by the kidnapping and murder of French nationals. It dreads the spectre of al-Qaida attacks on the European mainland, launched from northern Africa. President François Hollande has reportedly deployed surveillance drones over the Sahel. Paris is urging European partners to back the intervention, and the EU is said to be ready to send military advisers to help train the intervention force.
But others also appear to share Ban's reservations about military action and his fear that it could make matters worse. Algeria, for one, with its long, tragic experience of using violence against Islamists, has been cool to the idea all along. And nobody is exactly queuing up to pay for the adventure.
Dialogue could succeed. The Tuaregs' agenda is separatism, not ideologically anti-western zealotry, and moderate elements of Ansar Dine have no interest in allowing Islamist fundamentalism to spread. As the Guardian has reported, west African officials are pushing the Mali government to cut an autonomy deal with Tuaregs in exchange for their joining the fight against al-Qaida. Negotiations with myriad non-Tuareg groups are complex and problematic, but possible.
Launching another under-powered, under-funded and ill-thought-out military intervention in Africa is not the best way to counter al-Qaida. Indeed it may play into their hands. The idea of talking may not seem inspiring, but it may prove more effective in the long run than a 3,300-strong foreign army rattling around in an area roughly the size of France and Spain.