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Eleven years after 9/11 people are quick to link the group with violence in Libya and Syria. But things aren't that simple
Within hours of the death of the US ambassador to Libya, a familiar refrain was heard. The attack, apparently, had all the hallmarks of an al-Qaida operation.
Such comments were not the only throwback to some of the darkest hours since the 9/11 attacks almost exactly 11 years ago.
There was the outrage at the anti-Islamic film — so reminiscent of the Muhammad cartoons crisis of early 2006. There was a wave of violence in Iraq and a call-to-arms from the Taliban. Two video testaments by 9/11 hijackers even surfaced, released by al-Qaida's production house, as-Sahab.
Some might thus question the new consensus that the organisation founded by Osama bin Laden, killed in Pakistan last year, is in terminal decline.
But, as ever, the situation is more complex.
Eastern Libya has been home to a thriving militant tradition for many years. Hundreds of young men from the region went to Iraq to fight Americans there. It was a good recruiting ground for the now defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group too. A history of violent protest goes back to colonial times.
Since the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gadaffi, loose networks of local militants, some with experience of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, have coalesced there. Chaotic and fragmented, some of these groups may have been helped – possibly even mobilised or organised — by senior individuals sent from "al-Qaida central" in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the end of last year.
Since the summer, there has been a series of attacks of increasing competence on western interests in eastern Libya. No coincidence, some say.
But rather than al-Qaida itself or groups directed by the organisation, it is more likely that the responsibility for the attacks lies with local groups looking to join al-Qaida.
"What better way to prove one's jihadi credentials than an assault on a US consulate on the anniversary of 9/11?" said Noman Benotman, a former Libyan militant and London-based analyst.
But as correspondence found in Bin Laden's safe house revealed, the al-Qaida high command have learned from the problems caused by ill-disciplined "franchises" in the past and are wary of accepting new candidates for fear of further damaging the brand.
One question is why anyone would want to join al-Qaida at all. The "hardcore" leadership of al-Qaida has been seriously weakened in recent years. Almost all major players are dead or detained and the best al-Qaida central seem to be able to do on the anniversary of their most spectacular strike is to release old videos with older rhetoric.
The Olympics – an obvious target – made their weakness even more obvious. British intelligence did not find a single "credible threat" to the event, officials say, something not foreseen even by the most optimistic projections five years ago.
There are still volunteers making their way along "the pipeline" to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but there are many heading the other way too. Cash is tight and life is short in the tribal zones. A statement from the Taliban makes it clear that relations with al-Qaida are tense.
Newly emerging groups may want to join al-Qaida simply because the name still packs a powerful propaganda punch. In Syria, though many of the ideologically committed volunteer fighters drawn to the uprising shun any such association, some groups of fighters call themselves "al-Qaida" even when they have no link whatsoever. For new groups, the promise of resources, credibility and technical assistance that leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his associates can offer is attractive.
This should not be overstated, however. The spooks have a new word to describe what they are primarily seeing these days: "cross-over". This means a link-up between regional groups which, importantly, does not involve the hardcore leadership of al-Qaida. Already, networks in the Maghreb have connected with those in the Sahel and Nigeria. Donors in the Gulf have been linked to groups in east Asia. There is an emerging Somalia-Yemen nexus.
It is this web of connections – as well as lower level, local networks involving personal relations between key individuals – which it is believed will determine the nature of the threat in coming years.