Clik here to view.
Scientists warn that redacting information from new research on H5N1 virus could hinder the discovery of a vaccine
Moves by the US government to restrict the publication of papers describing potentially dangerous new strains of bird flu could do more harm than good by hampering progress towards a vaccine, scientists warn.
The US biosecurity watchdog has asked two leading scientific journals, Science and Nature, to remove sensitive details from the papers amid fears the research might fall into the hands of bioterrorists.
But scientists involved in the research discussed their experiments at public conferences earlier this year, leading some experts to doubt whether redacting the papers will have much effect.
"There is a cause for concern, but to restrict publication now is shutting the stable doors after the horse has bolted," said John Wood, the former chief virologist at the UK's National Institute for Biological Standards and Control. "It will only impede progress."
The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) contacted editors at the journals after reviewing two papers submitted by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
The papers described experiments in which natural strains of H5N1 bird flu, which do not spread easily from human to human, were mutated to make them more transmissible.
Though bird flu outbreaks have killed many of those infected, most people who contracted the virus caught it directly from birds. Since the virus became known, scientists have been racing to work out how it could mutate in the wild into a more transmissible strain that would spread quickly from person to person.
The mutated strains were created for research into drugs and vaccines, but if released from their high security containment facilities at university laboratories, have the potential to trigger a global pandemic.
In November, Dr Fouchier told a reporter on the journal, Science, that the strain of bird flu his team had created was "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make." The journal quoted Paul Keim, the chair of the NSABB, who worked extensively on anthrax, saying: "I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
The NSABB urged the journal editors to remove paragraphs from the manuscripts that explained how the experiments were done, along with other details that could help potential terrorists replicate the work and unleash a dangerous strain. The Department of Health and Human Services supported the requests.
The journals are now working with the US authorities to agree on a procedure whereby edited versions of the papers are published, but bona fide researchers can gain access to the crucial methods and other details that have been removed. The papers could be published next month.
Richard Ebright, a professor of molecular biology at Rutgers University in New Jersey, said the planned redactions would have "absolutely no practical impact" as the information had already been presented at conferences, seen by journal staff and sent to scientists for review.
The full manuscripts had also seen by NSABB staff and shared with a dozen US government agencies, and key information described in them had appeared in scientific and mainstream media.
"The proposed redactions are nothing more than a public relations measure – window dressing – intended to convey the impression that the issue is being addressed and thereby to minimise negative public reaction and deflect calls for effective regulation," Ebright told the Guardian.
Wendy Barclay, head of influenza virology at Imperial College London, said the mutations described in the papers would not be a surprise to anyone with a reasonable knowledge of the influenza virus, and doubted moves to restrict access to the full the publications.
"I am not convinced that withholding scientific know-how will prevent the highly unlikely scenario of misuse of information, but I am worried that it may stunt our progress towards the improved control of this infectious disease," she said.
"The technical details of the experiments are important to share with other experts in the field so that the robustness of the findings and implications of the data can be truly assessed, and so that this new information can be used to move the state of the art forwards," she added.