The committee report on the roots of violent radicalisation draws attention to the danger of ignoring far-right activity
Have we got the balance right in our current approach to countering extremism? For much of the past decade, western states have focused the bulk of attention on tackling al-Qaida-inspired terrorism, and the underlying processes of radicalisation that lead some citizens toward this specific form of violent extremism. The result is a large body of evidence on both the terrorist groups, and the factors that "push and pull" some individuals into engaging in violence on their behalf.
Given the new priorities of national security that emerged in the shadow of 9/11, this focus was both justified and understandable. But more than 10 years on, the challenge from extremism looks rather different. This point is reflected in a home affairs committee report on the roots of violent radicalisation, that is published today, and to which I gave evidence. As the report points out, while al-Qaida-inspired terrorism remains the dominant threat, the challenge from extremism is becoming more varied, and hence requires a more holistic approach.
In particular, the report notes that one form of extremism that has remained neglected for too long is the far right. Though often derided as a lunatic fringe or a movement of "ignoramuses and bigots", the far right continues to escape our serious attention. As the report points out, one view held by many is that government strategy on counter-extremism "only pays lip service to the threat from extreme far-right terrorism". In contrast, and after collecting evidence from a range of different experts and opinions, the committee concluded there was "persuasive evidence about the potential threat from the growth of far-right organisations", and that "[t]he Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to tackle far-right radicalisation".
For those of us who have long argued about the need to take the far right more seriously, this point is particularly welcome. The vast majority of far-right parties in Europe are not openly violent, and nor do they advocate violence as a political strategy. Nor, with some notable exceptions, are most supporters of these parties pro-violence. While there are borderline cases in Europe, such as the National Democratic Party (NPD), which is currently under the microscope because of its links to a violent neo-Nazi cell, most parties on the far-right wing reject violence because of their electoral ambitions.
But while not openly violent, I would argue that many of these movements do foster a culture of violence among followers, and a particular set of narratives that would deem violence acceptable under certain conditions. Like most political movements, the far right offers supporters its own vision of society, and reasons for them to get actively involved. But unlike mainstream parties, the narratives that the far right cultivate among its supporters – or what are known in social science as their "vocabularies of motive" – are in many respects different.
They emphasise impending threats to a wider (and typically ethnic) conception of society, whether immigration or the "threat" from a specific group, such as Muslims. They are wrapped in a survivalist discourse, explaining to supporters that unless they take urgent and radical action then their group will become extinct. They employ apocalyptic scenarios, often manipulating the "clash of civilisations" thesis or claiming Europe will soon become "Eurabia". They emphasise the need for supporters to take urgent and radical action to stem these threats, as reflected in the repeated claim that city X or city Y will soon become majority Muslim. They dismiss liberal and representative democracy as being incapable of responding to these threats. And, lastly, they emphasise a sense of moral obligation, that supporters must take action in order to save their loved ones and wider group.
These vocabularies of motive were evident in the "Breivik manifesto", and in the accounts of others who have been imprisoned after stockpiling chemical explosives in anticipation of a race war. Having spent six years interviewing the most committed supporters of the far right in Britain, I am also aware that many others would subscribe to this view. Furthermore, like previous decades, these narratives are further embedded through "narrowcasting", whereby supporters obtain their news and information from only one source. In this way, and like other extremist groups, the far right often manipulates statistics and events in a way that amplifies notions of threat, survivalism, urgency and action. For Breivik, this process appears to have taken place within prominent far-right blogs, such as Gates of Vienna. In Britain, it is found within websites such as StormFront.
Like today's report, my view is that we need to take this movement and its potential for violence far more seriously. If Norway taught us anything, it is that dismissing the far right as a collection of cranks is an outdated and inaccurate view. More research is needed on what might "trip" someone like Breivik from joining a radical far-right party into violence or, alternatively, what might pull these individuals back from the brink. But overall, we need to modify our view of this movement, and its adherents.